On 24 April, CANZ representatives met with PPS National Manager Phil McCarthy to present him with membership concerns in respect of the proposed draft policy for prison Entry Searching. As you will recall, your concerns were many and varied and it was not possible to discuss them all in one sitting. Accordingly, there is another consultative meeting scheduled for tomorrow and we will report back to the membership at the conclusion of that meeting.

However, as an interim measure, I am documenting PPS’s initial response (received today) to the matters raised so far. When you read this report, be assured that this is a record of PPS’s current position on the matters under discussion and in no way reflects CANZ’s views. As a membership-driven Union, we will continue to debate the issues of contention in an effort to develop mutually acceptable solutions.

PPS’s Interim Response

Policy Aspects.
1. Intent of the Policy

• The primary reason why this policy has been introduced is to provide protection to staff and visitors through not having them singled out and pressure applied to bring in drugs to prisons. It is an important aspect of keeping staff and other visitors safe not just a good thing to do.
• Additional security measures put in place over the past 5 years, which have reduced the traditional avenues inmates, used to get drugs into prisons.
• Supports the Reducing Drugs in New Zealand Prisons Strategy 2001-2004. Drugs Strategy is a requirement on the Chief Executive under 36B of the Penal Institutions Act 1954.
• The available avenues will be further reduced as more fences are installed and inmates confined within the fences until they can be placed at lower security sites.
• The intention is that the policy will apply to all people who enter a prison.

2. Rubdown Searches

• Provided for in Section 21(D) Penal Institutions Act 1954.
• They form the second stage of the searching process. The Act is clear that in most cases a scanner search then rubdown search is required before a strip search is carried out. Strip searches of staff or visitors may not be carried out by Prison Staff, (unless under Police direction) but Police will want to satisfy themselves that appropriate searches have been undertaken before they evoke a strip search under the Misuse of Drugs Act.
• This is the same principle used at the airports. If the scanner search indicates some contraband might be present a rubdown search is carried out to check what is causing the detector to alarm. The same applies to circumstances where people entering the prison go through a metal detector. If the detector continues to sound then a rubdown search is undertaken because reasonable cause exists. The rubdown search is another checking process.
• The Prison Entry Search process is not only intended to find drugs it is also intended to discover contraband as well.
• A staff member of the same gender as the person subject to the rubdown search carries out rubdown searches.
• We accept a Rubdown Search will not always discover carried contraband especially if internally secreted. This applies also to inmates and other visitors.

3. Staffing and Resources

• If we were to wait until such time as all prisons had the desired components in place that would expose the staff and PPS to too much continued risk. Further, why would we prevent ourselves from making the gains we can!
• Each site will work with the policy in the most appropriate way based on the resources the site has available to them. The main point is for all staff and visitors to understand that they are liable to be searched at any time.
• By implementing the policy in a planned way with the intent clearly spelt out this provides the framework to build on. However we recognise the limitations imposed by limited entry facilities on most sites.
• There is no intention to introduce designated search teams. All staff will be required to carry out searching, as they are currently required to do as part of their normal duties.
• Refurbishment of several sites over the next few years will assist in establishing single entry points as well as giving us the opportunity to further develop facilities which will assist the searching policy.

4. Prison/Vehicle Checkpoints

• Many International jurisdictions have single point entry to facilities with enhanced searching technology available including x-ray machines. Many of New Zealand's prisons do not have the full range of technology and single entry points: therefore it is desirable to operate additional procedures to complement the activities that already take place.
• As single points of entry are established and the movement of inmates outside the secure fences becomes infrequent on some sites, the need for vehicle checkpoints will be reduced if not eliminated.
• We have used Prison Checkpoints for five years with a great deal of success with many weapons, drugs and other contraband discovered. Staff have often undertaken checkpoints on their days off as they have relished the opportunity to ensure contraband was not bought into the prison, which could affect them or the inmates.
• There is still scope for random searching. For example the supervisor of the checkpoint can determine at the beginning of the day that every fourth car will be searched, or it might be determined that every vehicle will be searched.
• The policy allows for any person who enters a prison to be searched. This may occur on a more regular basis at sites where facilities and resources are closer to the optimal. At other sites the searches will occur less frequently. The location of search areas will vary and will be determined by Site Managers according to resourcing levels. However, the same search processes will apply to anyone entering the site at that search point.

5. Training and Selection of Staff

• All staff will be used for searching however the searching is likely to be in the main a function of the Custodial Support Unit.
• No additional training other than is required for Metal Detectors or other technology is deemed necessary. Searching is a fundamental part of an officers duties. Training is given in all aspects of searching from ITC to on the job. Custodial Officers probably carry out more searching than any other group, you know your job. Guidelines have been prepared for staff on vehicle checkpoints to assist in ensuring the right messages are relayed to visitors and staff.
• Staff briefings will be held prior to the operation of each checkpoint. The briefings will include a refresher on the search processes, communication to people searched, random selection if used and procedures to be used if people refuse to be searched.
• As discussed, we will develop clear standard written instructions covering rules for random selection and the "reasonable cause" guidelines set out above.

6. Vehicle Searches

• Vehicle searches relate to any vehicle entering the property. It must be remembered that anybody can refuse to be searched prior to entering the prison. We have taken this to mean the gatehouse, where no previous checkpoint is operating on prison property. Where there is a checkpoint this will form the point for initial screening/searching. Vehicles are treated differently under the legislation.
• If staff wish to leave their vehicles off site, they can. Nothing will be read into that, as many staff do not bring vehicles to work now.
• If claims for damages alleged to have been caused by a search are made they will be investigated. We are only aware of 2-3 claims in the last five years so we expect claims will remain low.
• Not intended to have vehicles lift hoists or truck trays. Staff will search the accessible points and not put themselves at risk.

7. Cultural Considerations

• During the consultation around the provisions for the Kaiwhakamana and Fautua Pasefika protocols for the national systems, the issues around prison entry processes including screening and searching were well consulted on. They were the subject of discussions at marae and by the CEMAG group in Corrections National Office.
• Several Kaumatua insisted during that consultation that they be put through the same screening as everyone else. One of the reasons for this was because they felt that if they were excluded from that process, the finger could be pointed at them if unauthorised items were found in the prison after their visits.

8. Privacy and Dignity

• The underlying tenet of the Prison Entry search policy is that it is consistent and applies to all people entering a prison while and where it is operational. All searches should be conducted in a manner that respects the dignity of the person being searched, and creates as little inconvenience as possible.
• Respect and sensitivity relates to the way in which the search is conducted. I am concerned that the issue of respect, sensitivity and dignity have suddenly arisen in respect of this new policy. These values should have been applied to all searching unto this point. I do not accept that searching of staff in any way demands higher standards; rather I expect staff to conduct all searches politely, civilly and with respect unless the particular response of the "searchee" requires otherwise.
• There are some people who will take issue with being required to go through the screening processes and staff will have to be sensitive and professional in their responses to them.
• Where searching of staff bags is to take place there will be an officer of each gender available.

9. Reasonable Cause

• What amounts to reasonable grounds will vary depending on the particular circumstances involved. Again, the Prison Entry Searching Policy is not introducing any changes to current practice on this point. Examples of situations which could constitute "reasonable grounds to suspect" include, but are not limited to:

1. A Detector dog indicating drugs on the person;
2. A metal detector indicating that metal is being carried;
3. Direct observation of suspicious activity; which could include attempting to hide items, or activity which is out of character for the person
4. The person having a known previous history of bringing unauthorised items into the prison;
5. Reliable information from a source such as the police or other Government agency, or an informant, directly relating to the person (or in the case of a private visitor relating to the inmate to be visited) concerning the bringing of unauthorised items in the prison. Note:

• Staff are concerned that there is potential for them to be set up, either through information supplied or the planting of drugs on their vehicles. There has always been the potential for this type of allegation, which happily has seen very few incidents over the years. The point of an investigation is to look at all the facts and determine whether a case exists.
• Information can be gathered from many sources including Jailsafe, police inmates and other staff. PPS need to preserve the privacy and integrity of staff but also ensure that the process does not inhibit the gathering of information.
• It is important that the information is dealt with in a way that preserves the privacy of the staff member.
• Any decision to direct a rubdown search of staff members as a result of information received, must be made by the Regional Manager who must satisfy themselves that the information is credible.
• Information implicating a staff member in misconduct of this nature will usually be handed to the Police in which case any action against staff would be directed by the Police.
• In all cases where a rubdown search is actioned as a result of information as opposed to other reasonable cause events, a manager will oversee the search process. The Manager will explain to the staff member that the search is been carried out on reasonable cause grounds.

  10. Medication
  Two options for staff:

• A Doctors note is held in the Health Unit advising of the need for the staff member concerned to be on a particular medication. Health staff can then confirm the existence of the letter if a search was to uncover the medication
• In those sites where the Health Unit is not staffed on a regular basis through the day the letter is lodged with the staff member's Unit Manager or Support Manager in the case of administration staff.

  11. Consequences

• B.12.01 outlines the possible consequences for people who fail to comply with the requirement for their vehicle to be searched.

• Staff must, if the circumstances warrant it, warn of the possible consequences if the person fails to comply with any direction or requirement made by an officer under s 21M, or obstructs staff carrying out a vehicle search.
  These are:
  1. It is an offence punishable on conviction by a fine not exceeding $1000 to fail, without reasonable excuse, to comply with any direction or requirement made by an officer under section 21M.
  2. Any person who obstructs staff carrying out a vehicle search is liable to be arrested for obstruction of a prison officer in the course of their duties (an offence under section 23 of the Summary Offences Act 1981, punishable on conviction by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 3 months or a fine not exceeding $2000).
  3. Where the person who has refused to allow the vehicle search is a Department of Corrections' staff member, the manager must also warn the person that failure to comply would represent serious misconduct and that an Employment Investigation will be undertaken in accordance with the Department's HR Procedures.

  12. Assorted issues

  1. Many staff currently have no option but to bring bags into the prisons because few locker rooms are outside the main gatehouse. In those cases care will be taken to ensure that Drug Detection Dogs are not able to contaminate foodstuffs. Staff though may be asked to open their own containers they have in their bags so they can be checked.

Please bear in mind that the above text represents PPS’s initial response to concerns raised and be assured that CANZ neither supports these views nor accepts them as a final outcome to the consultative process.

As always, we’ll keep you informed.
Regards,
Brian Davies
National Organiser